That case involved a decision by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) which gave the State of Maine permitting authority, under the Clean Water Act and MICSA, with regard to discharge of pollutants into territorial waters of the Penobscot Nation and Passamaquoddy Tribe, but exempted two Tribal-owned facilities from the State's permitting program. Despite a detailed Opinion Letter from the U.S. Department of the Interior supporting the Tribe's claims, the court upheld the State’s authority to regulate all of the disputed sites, including the two tribal-owned sites located on tribal lands which the EPA had found to have insignificant consequences for non-members of the tribes.

Former employees of the Micmacs filed complaints with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging violations of their rights under state law. In response, the Micmacs contended that they possess inherent sovereign rights to control their internal tribal matters. According to the Tribe, employment decisions are a function of tribal government not subject to state regulation. The First Circuit concurred with the State’s argument that MICSA 25 USCS §1725(a) applies to the Micmacs.

Former employees of the Maliseets filed complaints with the Maine Human Rights Commission alleging violations of their rights under state law. In response, the Maliseets contended that they possess inherent sovereign rights to control their internal tribal matters. According to the Tribe, employment decisions are a function of tribal government not subject to state regulation. The First Circuit concurred with the State’s argument that MICSA 25 USCS §1725(a) applies to the Maliseets.

Fellencer was an employment case where the Maine Superior Court ruled that employment matters did not fall under the internal tribal matters provisions of the MIA. On January 19, 1999, Fellencer was reversed on appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals, First Circuit, and the case was remanded for the entry of judgment (reversed) in favor of the Penobscot Indian Nation.

In 1996, the Passamaquoddy Tribe brought suit against the State of Maine on gaming (Passamaquoddy v. State of Maine 75 F.3d 784 (1996)) (Addendum 8). The Tribe argued that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (enacted after Stilphen and in the wake of Cabazon) opened the door for Tribal gaming in Maine and compelled the State to compact with the Tribe. The Court found that section 1735(b) was a valid "savings clause" that precluded application of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in Maine unless Congress specifically made it applicable in Maine. The Court concluded that the text of IGRA gave no indication that Congress intended to make that Act specifically applicable within Maine.